Introduction
In the "interleaving" approach to concurrent process theory, the operational behavior of a process is completely captured by a synchrmization tree, a rooted, unordered tree whose edges are labelled with symbols denoting basic actions or events, which is generally infinite and nondeterministic [14, 17, 10, 12, 3, 5, 9, 4, 11,221. Milner's CCS [ 17, 191, Hoare's CSP [ 14, 151 and Hennessy's algebraic theory of processes [12] are notable theories of this kind.
The concept of an internal "hidden" or r-action is another important aspect and point of contrast among these theories. However, in this paper we restrict ourselves to the technically simpler case without internal r-actions. We expect many of our results to generalize to the case with internal actions, but we have not investigated this as yet.
These interleaving theories further agree that synchronization trees are an overspecification of process behavior-certain distinct trees must be regarded as equivalent processes. The main theoretical difference among the theories is in which trees are identified.
In CSP [15] , two processes are identified if they are equivalent with respect to a limited class of "button-pushing" experiments.
A process is thought of as a black box, with one button for each action it can take. The experimenter presses buttons on the box. If the process can actually take that action, the machine will change state; if it cannot, the button does not allow itself to be pressed. Two processes are identified if they can perform the same sequences of actions followed by the same set of failures. An independent notion of experimental equivalence is defined by De Nicola and Hennessy [lo] considering both necessary and possible success of certain interactive experiments on processes. In our setting without hidden moves, De
Nicola-Hennessy experimental equivalence and the CSP failure-experiment equivalence coincide [12] (see also [2] for an extensive algebraic analysis of a variety of testing scenarios). CCS is based on a finer equivalence relation on synchronization trees called &simulation [19] . Although
Milner's original definition of bisimulation was not given in terms of button-pushing experiments on black boxes, he does offer a justification in these terms in [18] . In these experiments, the experimenter is given the ability to perform repeated subexperiments from any state, allowing the exploration of the alternatives available in a given state. This may be phrased in several ways; for example, one might permit the experimenter to Saue states and later restore the process to any saved state. These must be the only operations on states, e.g., the experimenter cannot test states for equality. An alternative formulation is that the experimenter is equipped with a duplicator, allowing the creation of identical copies of the process in any state. The experimenter may perform experiments on the copies, and combine the results. In general, an experiment on a process P should consist of placing P in a context, C[ P], involving other processes, and performing experiments on C[ P]. However, it will turn out that the use of contexts expressible in CCS-or indeed in a very generous class of extensions of CCS-does not change any of the experimental equivalences which we consider, and so it suffices simply to perform experiments on isolated processes. In other words, all the experimental equivalences mentioned above and considered below are in fact congruences. In the next section, we offer what we consider to be the most natural formalization of the kind of experiments with copying described informally above. We call these duplicator experiments.
Our first observation is that despite similar motivation and informed description, duplicator experiments differ notably from the experiments which characterize bisimulation [ 181.
Proposition 1.1. Equivalence with respect to duplicator experiments is a strictly coarser relation than bisimulation.
One of the main results of this paper is that duplicator experimental equivalence coincides with GSOS congruence [7] . GSOS The crucial difference between our duplicator experiments and Milner's is that Milner's are able to do more than make duplicates of a process. A Mimer experimenter is able to know when enough duplicates have been made to explore all possible alternative behaviors ofthe duplicated process. Mimer uses the metaphor of "weather conditions"-these determine which nondeterministic choice the process will make. The experimenter is allowed to choose the sequence of weather conditions that the process will experience [ 181. This gives the experimenter the ability to observe the process in all possible nondeterministic behaviors.
It is clear that, in this scenario, the number of weathers available must vary over the course of the experiment, although (as the experimenter is expected to test the process in all weathers, and we require experiments to take finite time) it must always be finite in each state. If the number of weathers were fixed (say, at k), then it would not be possible to explore all the behaviors of a process capable of k + l-fold branching.
The number of weathers cannot even be fixed for a particular process; it is straightforward to write in CCS a process with at least n-fold branching on its nth step. one imagines continuously turning a dial, each setting of which determines a weather. The dial has no markings, and it is impossible to tell which weather is active at a given instant. An experiment consists of the usual kinds of button-pushing, and a turn-the-dial experiment involving performing a subexperiment in each of the (infinitely many) settings of the dial, and taking the conjunction or disjunction of the results. Call these modal globaltesting experiments;
we can now rephrase Milner's result as follows. Approximation between processes has been usefully interpreted in the Hoare and
Hennessy process theories as a satisfaction relation between an implementing process and a less determinate specifying process; this has lead to a methodology for process specification and verification. Ready simulation is a notion of process approximation which may likewise be interpreted as specification satisfaction.
In fact, there are straightforward notions of approximation associated with each of the alternative definitions of ready simulation in Theorem 1.3 above, all of which coincide for ' If S, and sz are synchronization trees, then their sum .A, + s2 is the tree obtained by identifying the roots of sI and .s2.
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finitely branching processes. We note that, for processes without internal actions, no characterizations of bisimulation in terms of an approximation relation is known.
Experiments on machines
In general, we wish to justify a notion of process equivalence P= Q by giving an experimental scenario for it. That is, P Z Q if and only if there is some experiment which distinguishes them. Scenarios serve as plausibility arguments for notions of process equivalence; they may be used to judge the appropriateness of particular equivalences. If a particularly appealing scenario precisely captures = (as the button-pushing scenarios described below precisely capture refusal semantics) then = becomes more appealing. Conversely, a mathematically beautiful notion of process equivalence may be called into question by the nonexistence of a plausible testing scenario for it. As "plausible testing scenario " is an informal notion, this criterion cannot be used to refute any process equivalence absolutely. The idea of "button-pushing" experiments on processes has been highlighted by Hoare as an explanation of CSP semantics. A process is presented as a black box with buttons labelled with the visible atomic actions, and no other controls.
If process P can perform action a, then it is possible to press the u-button and then the machine will change state. If P cannot perform a, then the u-button is locked; the experimenter can press the button, discover that the machine cannot perform an a, and then continue experimenting on P itself. A number of variants of simple button-pushing experiments have been considered [24, 21] . Perhaps the most detailed kind of simple button-pushing is a lighted-button experiment. In this scenario, the black box resembles certain soft-drink machines: its buttons have lights inside them, and the light on the a-button is lit when that button is disabled. In other words, the experimenter can see at every stage which actions are possible and which are not, without changing the state of the machine. Formally, a lighted-button experiment is a sequence &a,+, . . an&+, alternating between sets S, of actions and actions ai E Si; it succeeds when SO is the set of initially disabled actions, S, is the set of disabled actions after a, is pressed, and so on. Nevertheless, there is a simple experiment distinguishing these processes. We imagine equipping the experimenter with a duplicator, allowing him to copy the machine at any time, and perform independent experiments on the copies. Equivalently, we allow him to save and restore states of the machines. For example, we might think of implementing such experiments in software using an operating system fork.
The typical sort of duplicator-experiment looks something like the following.
(1) Press the u-button on P, and call the resulting machine P,. Fail if the a-button cannot be pushed. (2) Make two copies of P,, call them P,, and PClr. This step cannot fail. The process a(bc+ cd) can pass this test, but the process abc+ abd cannot. So duplication increases the power of a lighted-button experimenter.
In fact, equivalence with respect to duplicator experiments is precisely ready simulation; this is a corollary to Theorem 2.7.
It is well-known that understanding bisimulation in general seems to require exploring the behavior of all the children of a process. We present an excessively powerful form of duplicator experiment, called wild duplicator experiments, in which the experimenter is allowed to make any quantity (not necessarily finite) of copies of the process at each stage, and perform separate experiments on the copies. In particular, it is possible for the experimenter to see all the children of a process. We will show that this form of duplicator still only observes ready simulation. We will allow infinite numbers of tests, and arbitrary Boolean combinations of the results. We do not restrict infinities to be countable.
The The intent is that nodes v labelled with actions a involve pushing the u-button on the process. If the button can be pushed, then the experimenter proceeds with V+ on the resultant process; otherwise, the experimenter performs V_ on the unchanged original process. Nodes labelled with K-ary Boolean functions instruct the experimenter to make K copies of the process, perform the appropriate experiment on each copy, and combine the results by applying B. Nodes labelled choose allow the experimenter to choose one of the children and perform that experiment. A simple duplication is modeled by a Boolean node. For example, consider an experiment which makes two copies of the process, runs test 15, and E, on them, and succeeds iff both tests succeed; this is formalized by a node labelled by the binary and function, with children given by the formalizations of E, and E,. The wild duplicator, which produces some unknown number of children, is a choice node with one child for the experiment to be performed on each number of children. For example, if the experiment is "Wild-duplicate P, and perform E on each copy, succeeding iff each copy succeeds", then the formalization starts with a single choose node with countably many children, the nth of which is an n-fold or node.
We write root(E) for the root node of the tree E.
Definition 2.4. We define P p E (resp. PC E), p renounced "P can pass (resp. fail) E", iff there is some partial function { from the nodes of E to pairs of truth values and processes, such that S(root(E)) = (tt, P), (resp. (ff, P)) and whenever C(V) = (b, R) we have the following. l v is labelled choose, has K children v,,, and there is some p <K such that S(vp)=(b, R). We say that 5 demonstrates that P 4 E (resp. P$ E).
Intuitively, l assigns to each node a process and the success or failure of the experiment given by that node on that process; the consistency conditions chart the progress of the experiment.
It is possible that both P T E and PC E; consider the wild duplicator experiment which succeeds precisely when the duplicator produces a prime number of copies. It is also possible to define experiments which can report both success and failure from the same sequence of actions of the process; e.g., the experiment which consists of infinitely often duplicating the process and never actually letting it perform an action.
We define P ~Wild Q as for all experiments E, whenever P 'f E then Q T E. For each experiment E there is an experiment 1E such that P 'T 1E iff P$ E and vice versa; take IE to be the experiment E with an extra root node labelled by the negation function. Thus, we lose no generality by considering only successes. We will need to construct demonstrations i; the following lemma makes the construction easier.
Definition 2.5. The function f is a consistent choice function for P&P' if f is a
function from the descendants of P to those of P', such that f(P) = P' and for all Q + R descendants of P, the following holds:
Lemma 2.6. Suppose that P and P' are arbitrarily-branching trees such that Pg P'. Then there is a consistent choice function for P c P'.
Proof. We may nonconstructively build such a function f by the Axiom of Choice. Let s be a well-ordering of the descendants of P'. Define a sequence of partial functions f;, taking the ith level of P (counting the root as level 1) to that of P', as follows. Let f,(P) = P'. Suppose that R is on the nth level of P, and R + S. Let fn+,(S) be S', the s-first descendant offn(R) such that S&S'; there is at least one such S' by the fact that R sf( R). Let f(T) =fn( T) where T is on the nth level of l? It is easy to see that f is a consistent choice function for Pq P'. 0 Theorem 2.7. For all (arbitrarily branching) processes P and Q, P ~Wild Q ifsPc Q.
Proof. We first show that sWild is a ready simulation relation, and hence P sWild Q implies PF Q. Suppose that P sWild Q and P s P'; we must show Q % Q' for some Q' such that P' sWild Q'. Suppose that there were no such Q'. Then for each u-child Qb, we have P' g,,,,i,d Q&; thus, there is some experiment E, such that P' f' E,, but not Qh 1' E,. Let E' be the experiment which takes the conjunction of all the E,.
Then P' p E', but no QCY can pass E'. Let E be the experiment which starts by pushing the cu-button, and then running E'; P can pass E, but Q cannot. This violates the hypothesis that P swila Q.
For the other clause of ready simulation, suppose that P swild Q and P -?+. Then P can pass the experiment which pushes the u-button, failing if it can be pushed and succeeding if it cannot. Q must pass this experiment as well; hence Q A. For the converse, suppose that Ph Q and P TE. Let [ be any function demonstrating that P T E. We will construct a function 5' demonstrating that Q T E. Let f be a consistent choice function for P& Q. Define i (&f(R)) if C(V) = (b, R) and R E descendants(P),
5'(v) = (b, R)
if cJ'( V) = (b, R) and R sf descendents( P), undefined otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that 5' demonstrates that Q 9 E. q
It is worth noting that simple duplicator experiments (with binary Boolean operations and no choice nodes) suffice to capture ready simulation of finitelybranching processes; see [6] for more details.
Global testing experiments
For any process P, let Succ, (P) = {P' : P -% P'}. In our setting, this set of successor processes of P will always be finite.' Notice that a duplicator, by making ISucc,( P)I copies of P and pressing an u-button on each copy, has the possibility of getting the entire set Succ,(P) to experiment upon. Milner's experimental explanation of bisimulation reveals that the experimenter must, however, do more than merely have the possibility to see all the successors-he must know when he has seen them all.
' Also, as we are taking synchronization trees as our basic semantics, there may be several isomorphic elements of Succ,,( P). In particular, the process a + a has a synchronization tree with two leaves, which are isomorphic but not equal; Succ,,(a + a) is the (two-element) set containing those two leaves.
This is formalized in [ 181, where Mimer describes a mechanism for exploring all the alternatives available from a given state, by allowing variation of some "ambient ('weather') conditions" which determine which nondeterministic choice the machine will take. We formulate 'weathers' in terms of a global-testing duplicator [l] . The global-testing duplicator is a device with a chamber, a control panel with one button per action, and a chute. The experimenter places the machine in the chamber, and presses a button on the control panel, say the u-button. Out of the chute drops one copy of each a-descendant of the process.
However, global-testing goes too far; global-testing equivalence is strictly finer than bisimulation. The experimenter can simply count the black boxes that come out of the chute. In Mimer's metaphor, this is counting the number of varieties of weather available to investigate. In fact, we have the following theorem. The test which distinguishes them is: "put the process in the global-testing duplicator.
Press the u-button. Succeed iff one box comes out the chute". Actually this simple form of global-testing duplicator does not precisely match Milner's weather scenario: two different forms of weather may drive the process into the same state. Milner's description directly corresponds to the wildglobal-testing duplicator, which may produce one or more copies of each descendent of its input. This uncertainty blurs the counting of successor processes, raising the prima facie possibility that nonisomorphic process trees might be identified. The same experiment distinguishes a from a + a, although in a slightly different way. Now, a may pass the experiment, although it will no longer pass it in every run; however a + a must fail in every run.
In fact, the wildness does not blur any distinctions at all, as is seen in the following result. We will first define a partial order P5 Q on finite trees. Let P r n be P truncated at depth n. Unlike most comparisons between processes we have considered, I is antisymmetric; P 5 Q and Q 5 P will imply P = Q (viz. that P and Q are isomorphic synchronization trees). We will construct experiments E,, such that P can pass
iff P 1 n 5 Q r n. If P and Q are distinct synchronization trees, then for some n we have P r n % Q r n, and so either P 1 n 5 Q 1 n or Q 1 n 5 P / n. So, E,, or E,, will distinguish P and Q, and the theorem will follow. The necessary mathematics will take up the rest of this section. That is, each child of Q has a "cousin" which is a child of P, and distinct children of P have distinct cousins in Q. It is easy to show that i is a preorder. Proof. Reflexitivity, transitivity, and congruence are straightforward. By a predictable induction on n, we show that it is antisymmetric; that is, if P 5 Q 5 P then P and Q are isomorphic synchronization trees. This is trivial if P = Q = 0. Let P and Q be expressed as in ( Therefore f and g are also onto, and so fg and gf are permutations.
Recall that if h is a permutation of a finite set and i is an element of that set, then the set {i, h(i), hC2'(i), . . .} is a finite set, called the orbit of i under h; as h is l-l, we must have hCA'( i) = i for some k, called the period of i.
Fix i. We have where k is the period of i. By transitivity, we have Q ",,, (,, 5 Po,i, and so by induction Pa,, = Qa,,tt). With a little bit of work, this establishes a bijection between the children of P and those of Q as desired. 0
We now define the experiments E,, such that P can pass E,, iff P r n 5 Q r n. The experiment E,, always succeeds. To see if P can pass EO,,+,, wild-duplicate P under each action a, giving Pb,, . . . , Pk,,,. If piI # q0 then the experiment fails.
If pb = qa then for each i, see if Phi passes EvC2,,, Eg,,+, succeeds if each E,<,,,, succeeds.
Lemma 3.5. P can pass E,, iff P 1 n 5 Q 1 n.
Proof. This clearly is true for n = 0. For greater n, suppose that P can pass E,,.
Let P and Q be given as in (* suppose the former. Then by Lemma 3.5, we know that P cannot pass E,, but Q can. Hence P and Q are distinguishable with a wild global-testing experiment. 0
Modal logic
Modal logics which arise naturally in process specification are intimately connected to experimental equivalence.
It is possible to give a straightforward logic for ready simulation, which we call denial logic (called "limited modal logic" in [7] ). Disjunction does not increase the descriptive power of denial logic, because the law and satisfaction is defined as usual:
l P k tt always, l Pl=cpr\$iffPK~andP~+, l P k (a)cp iff for some P', P % P' and P' k cp, such that P+ P', P' k cp. Note that the denial formula Can't(u) is expressible in HML as [a]ff, so denial formulas can be seen as a special case of HML formulas. Now it is straightforward to seen how to distinguish non-bisimilar processes using a (modal) global-testing duplicator. Processes P and Q are not bisimilar iff there is some Hennessy-Milner formula cp which distinguishes them, say Pi= cp and Q # cp. We can construct an experiment e, from cp on which P can succeed, but Q never will. For example, the experiment e(u)q starts with pressing the u-button, and then performs e, on the resulting machine (or failing if the u-button cannot be pressed). Dually, the experiment eIo19 does an a-button global-test duplication of the machine in the chamber and checks to see that every machine coming out of the chute passes e,.
Conclusion
We have extended the notion of experimental equivalence of processes by considering experiments in which processes can be duplicated, allowing collection of information about alternative process behaviors during an experiment. This idea was originally suggested by Milner as yielding an experimental understanding of bisimulation between processes. The authors have found it hard to provide a physical justification or operational rationale for a key technical restriction used in Milner's experimental characterization of bisimulation-that experimental outcomes only be combined "modally".
The apparently more natural variations of duplicating-experiment equivalence we have examined-ready similarity and unordered tree isomorphism-respectively strictly coarsen and strictly refine bisimulation. 
